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There is without question a great deal of uncertainty in planning and policy
formation. Our starting point in approaching this uncertainty is that ‘Counter-
factuals are the very guide of life’.1 For rational planning we need counterfac-
tuals because we need to evaluate what would happen were each of the actions
under consideration implemented. For this kind of deliberation there is always a
vast amount we do not know – facts, laws, probabilities, people’s reactions etc.
This essay will focus on a more abstract source of ignorance that contributes
to uncertainty in planning: We do not know how in principle to evaluate coun-
terfactuals. There is a considerable literature in philosophy on the semantics of
counterfactuals and recently contributions in economics itself. The bulk of this
literature, we shall argue, puts the problems back to front. It attempts to use
counterfactuals to evaluate causal claims; we argue instead that one must use
causal claims to assess counterfactuals.2 That said, there is as yet no general
account of how to do so.
The reason the literature has the problems back to front is that parts of
both philosophy and economics are still in the grip of the ‘Hume problem’. Like
David Hume, many philosophers and economists feel that causality is an ille-
gitimate concept. Counterfactuals are called in to secure legitimacy for it. As
we shall argue, this skews the study of genuine policy counterfactuals – those
counterfactuals that can be exploited for policy purposes. The Humean philoso-
phers and economists study a different kind of counterfactuals – counterfactuals
that could possibly stand in for causal concepts. But what we need for policy
are counterfactuals that describe what would happen were our policies put into
place. Unfortunately a semantics geared to the stand-ins for causal concepts
fares badly at evaluating policy counterfactuals.
Thus we will argue for two related but independent claims, both concerned
with the relationship between causality and counterfactuals. The first is that
causal knowledge is required to evaluate policy counterfactuals. The second is
that those counterfactuals invoked to stand in for causal concepts are a poor
tool for answering the ‘What if?’ questions policy makers are concerned with.
Section 2 will argue the case that we need causal models to answer the kinds
of ‘What if?’ questions raised in policy and planning. We shall then point out
in Section 3 a number of ways in which counterfactuals can be ambiguous. A
first step in providing counterfactual hypotheses for use in policy and planning,
we maintain, is to be clear exactly what counterfactual hypothesis is under con-
sideration, and this requires explicit assumptions about how the counterfactual
antecedent is to be implemented. Section 4 and 5 will describe two attempts
to do the job we urge. Section 4 will describe Judea Pearl’s theory of causal
1Paraphrased from the famous dictum, “Probability is the very guide of life”. See Kyburg
and Thalos 2003.
2Apart from the work on causality and counterfactuals there is also a great deal of work on
the logic of counterfactuals. (For a survey, see Edgington 1995.) But the semantics provided
in this area is difficult to connect with economic problems. At any rate we shall not discuss
it here.
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models and counterfactuals, based on his work on Bayes nets. Section 5 will
look at the work of James Heckman.
Both of the accounts we shall look at use counterfactuals to explicate causal
notions. Neither, however, is engaged in a fully-fledged Hume programme. For
both begin, as we urge one must, with a causal model, a model that contains
some set of causal principles. The notion of causality involved in the causal prin-
ciples is left unanalysed. The causal model is used to evaluate counterfactuals
and then the causal concept of concern is defined in terms of the counterfactual.
Even if this method does not provide a total elimination of causal concepts, if
successful it can at least explicate more problematic causal notions in terms of
less problematic ones. The cost, however, is in the hope to use the accounts to
answer more general kinds of counterfactual questions. The attempt to capture
the intended causal notions skews the accounts; whether or not they succeed at
explicating the causal notions of concern, neither can double as a semantics for
the ‘What if?’ counterfactuals required for policy formation.
2 The Need for Causal Models to Evaluate Pol-
icy Counterfactuals
Policy analysts are often interested in answers to questions with the structure
‘What would have happened to Y (the ‘target variable’), had X been x (the
‘control variable’ and its value, respectively)?’ Both control and target vari-
able can be binomial or continuous. We might for example ask what would
have happened to the profits of British utilities had they not been privatised
or whether the 9/11 incidents would have occurred had investments in national
security been as high as demanded by some Democrats. We want to call these
questions genuine ‘What if?’ questions (and the corresponding policy counter-
factuals, genuine policy counterfactuals) because although formally they refer
to hypothetical scenarios, their answers prepare the policy maker for a situation
in which what he supposes actually happens.
How does one find answers to a genuine ‘What if?’ question? We contend
that such questions are always answered against a causal model in which the
control variable figures as a cause and the target variable as an effect.
Philosophers, and some economists, tend to regard priority the other way
around. Many thinkers in the Humean tradition view counterfactuals as more
fundamental and causal relations as derivative. David Lewis, for example, de-
velops a counterfactual theory of causation that takes the following quote from
Hume as starting point:3
we may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where
all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to
the second. Or, in other words where, if the first object had not been,
the second never had existed.
3quoted from Lewis 1993/1973, p. 193
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Based on this underlying idea, Lewis develops a theory that defines causal
relations in terms of ‘chains of counterfactual dependence’. The details of his
theory do not matter here. But in our view, it is peculiar to invoke Hume for
this project. Hume was an empiricist of a particular brand. For him, a concept
was meaningless unless associated with an idea which itself was a copy of a
direct sense impression. Now, it is disputable whether we can have direct sense
impressions of causal relations. Hume certainly believed that we cannot. But
it is absurd to suppose that there is a sense impression from which we can copy
the idea of the ‘object that would never have existed’.
Hume’s associationist theory of knowledge has long been out of fashion. In
its stead, a contemporary empiricist will demand that our claims are made on
the basis of the best evidence at hand. But from the evidential point of view,
counterfactuals do not seem to fare any better. No (direct) evidence can be had
for a statement that describes a state of affairs which is ‘counter to the facts’.
The usual strategy, then, is to translate the counterfactual into a different kind
of statement, for example a statement about possible worlds or about laws of
nature. Although theories of counterfactuals tend to focus on semantic rather
than epistemological issues, eventually the problem of how to justify belief in
counterfactuals must be addressed. Robert Stalnaker, for example, notes:4
For similar reasons, the empiricist may be uncomfortable about a
theory which treats counterfactuals as literal statements about non-
actual situations. Counterfactuals are often contingent, and contin-
gent statements must be supported by evidence. But evidence can
be gathered, by us at least, only in this universe. [. . . ]
It is because counterfactuals are generally about possible worlds
which are very much like the actual one, and defined in terms of
it, that evidence is so often relevant to their truth. When I wonder,
for example, what would have happened if I had asked my boss for
a raise yesterday, I am wondering about a possible world that I have
already roughly picked out. It has the same history, up to yesterday,
as the actual world, the same boss with the same dispositions and
habits.
But now it seems that the theorist who regards counterfactuals as more
fundamental than causal relations is in a dilemma. The statement into which
the counterfactual is translated either does or does not involve causal concepts.
If it does involve causal concepts, the theory is circular and counterfactuals have
not been shown to be more fundamental than causal relations (note for example
Stalnaker’s own use of the notions ‘dispositions’ and ‘habits’—both are, in our
view, causal notions).5 If, on the other hand, the statement does not involve
4Stalnaker 1968
5It is a different question whether the circularity is vicious or virtuous. Below, we will
discuss a case where certain causal concepts are defined in terms of counterfactuals, which in
turn are evaluated in a causal model. But knowledge about the causal concepts defined in this
procedure is not required in the model construction. Thus new causal knowledge is extracted
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causal concepts, the theory is likely to fall prey to one or more of the difficulties
that agonise all reductive theories of causation. These difficulties include6:
• the problem of concomitant effects
• the problem of co-extensionality
• Simpson’s paradox
• . . .
Of course, one cannot prove that all reductive theories, even future ones, will
suffer difficulties like these. However, from the past record of failed attempts it
seems a reasonable move to give up trying rather than keeping to fail.
Witness that our argument here against counterfactual theories of causation
differs from the usual strategy employed when these theories are criticised. The
usual strategy consists in choosing a particular formulation of a theory, finding a
case where one would intuitively say that x causes y but where the theory yields
a negative answer (or the other way around). Bill and Suzy throw rocks at a
bottle7. Bill’s rock hits the bottle a split second before Suzy’s does and the bottle
shatters. Intuitively, we would say that Bill’s throwing the rock caused the bottle
to shatter. But had he not thrown the rock, the bottle would have shattered
anyway. Thus, according to one na¨ıve formulation of the counterfactual theory,
Bill’s throwing does not come out as the cause of the shattering. And yet, we
would say it is the cause. Thus this version of the theory must be false.
These criticisms, then, are based on intuitions or ordinary language usage.
The argument put forward here, by contrast, is based on evidential consider-
ations. It maintains that the evidence in favour of a counterfactual can never
be better than the evidence in favour of the associated statement about causal
relations. Therefore, we reject the view that counterfactuals are more funda-
mental.
Thus far, conditional on the soundness of our argument, we can reject coun-
terfactual theories of causation, but this does not give us a causal theory of
counterfactuals. Why, then, believe that counterfactuals can only be analysed
in terms of causal models? The reasons for this are mainly pragmatic. There
is a great variety of kinds of counterfactuals, and each kind demands its own
mode of translation. Just consider a few stock philosophical examples:
• If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been Italian.
• If God had had a daughter, it would have been Carol.
• If the pressure in this container had been p, its temperature would have
been t.
(among other things) from old causal knowledge. This kind of circularity is not vicious but it
renders the counterfactual definition superfluous.
6For further discussion see Cartwright 1983 and 1989.
7This is case that widely discussed by philosophers. See for example Lewis 2000.
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• If Nixon had pushed the button, there would have been a nuclear holo-
caust.
To answer whether the first counterfactual is true is a matter of logic and
meaning. To be compatriots, Bizet and Verdi would have needed to live in
the same country. This could have been Italy, France or any other country
for that matter. Thus the truth value is indeterminate. But we do not need
causal knowledge in order to evaluate it. Living in a country does not cause one
to be someone else’s compatriot. The second counterfactual is metaphorical.
In order to answer it, we may want to ask whether Carol has a number of
characteristics we conventionally ascribe to Jesus, say, kind-heartedness and
generosity. For the third one, we might invoke a model but (according to many)
a purely associational model is sufficient. We do not need to know how the
pressure value comes about or how it brings about the temperature. Only the
fourth counterfactual seems to require causal knowledge, knowledge about the
technological and sociological nexus Nixon lived in.
The point is that different kinds of counterfactuals require different kinds of
translations. A priori, there is no primacy of translation into causal models. But
the topic here is not counterfactuals simpliciter but counterfactuals relevant to
policy making. It seems thus safe to suppose that counterfactuals which can be
addressed on the basis of logical or semantic relations, or which are metaphorical
in nature do not play an important role.
The matter is not so simple with respect to causal versus associational mod-
els. Laws of association (or the models that represent them) can be used to
evaluate counterfactual claims. Just recall that the gas law – an associational
law – was used above with reference to the third example. But in the context
of policy making in most cases the formulation of the question is at least partly
causal in nature. Usually, we ask whether one can use a certain socio-economic
variable as a kind of handle to control another variable – the money stock
to control prices, investment in schooling to control education and the latter
to influence income and inequality, interest rates to control economic activity.
Causal models, then, are the appropriate tools to evaluate these kinds of policy
counterfactuals.
There is also another reason. Suppose our counterfactual question was of a
kind that could be answered on the basis of an associational law. For instance,
we want to know what the unemployment rate would have been had inflation
been x – without implying either that we would have caused the inflation rate
to assume that value or that there is a causal relationship between inflation and
unemployment. We may then want to use the Phillips curve to answer that
counterfactual. The problem with that suggestion is that the Phillips curve and
many other economic ‘laws’ are at best more or less stable empirical relation-
ships but not ones that deserve the name ‘law’. We may calculate measures of
association between variables but these do not usually sustain counterfactuals
about what would happen under interventions. That such ‘laws’ fare badly at
making policy predictions is a sign of that.
On the other hand, all methods in economics designed to answer counterfac-
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tual questions are in fact methods of causal (rather than associational) inference.
Bayes’-nets methods8, the potential outcome framework9, Heckman’s ‘counter-
factuals’10, natural experiments a` la Herbert Simon11, James Hamilton12 and
others, Kevin Hoover’s invariance account13, they all answer causal questions.
Importantly, if they fail to answer these questions (because the method has not
been applied correctly or it is inadequate for the situation at hand for instance),
they do not answer associational questions either – they answer nothing.
There are no established methods of associational inference in econometrics.
So we cannot show that no associational models will work. It is not entirely
established, then, that policy counterfactuals require causal models for their
proper evaluation but currently this appears to be the best one can do.
What then is a causal model? That, we contend, is the central question.
What characterizes a causal model depends on what one wants to do with the
model. Both Pearl and Heckman provide explicit answers to the question of
what constitutes a causal model and both give explicit rules for how to assess
the truth values of counterfactuals given a causal model. Both use the coun-
terfactuals they evaluate to define new causal notions. But neither is adequate
in general for assessing genuine counterfactuals of direct use in planning and
policy formation. That is why we urge that more work needs to be done.
An adequate account of how to evaluate counterfactuals from causal models
will require
• A description of what a causal model consists in
• Rules for how to evaluate counterfactuals given the model
• An argument to show that the results are correct: the propositions thus
evaluated really are the ones we are trying to assess.
Pearl provides all three ingredients, as a good formal account of counterfac-
tuals and causal models should. Despite this, we shall argue, the counterfactuals
he assesses are not in general the ones we need for policy and planning, though
they may serve a variety of other purposes, including the definition of new causal
notions. Heckman has an explicit proposal for the first two. As to the third,
we shall show that, trivially, his characterization captures the concept of causal
contribution when applied in linear systems, but it will not double as a seman-
tics for the kinds of counterfactuals that can be put directly to use in planning
and policy formation.
8See e.g. Spirtes et al. 2001 and Pearl 2000.
9Rubin 1977. For an accessible account, see Holland 1988.
10Heckman 2000 and 2001. It will become apparent in a later Section of this paper why we
put the counterfactual in scare quotes here.
11Simon 1953 and 1954
12Hamilton 1994
13Hoover 2001. For a discussion, see Reiss forthcoming.
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3 Exactly What Counterfactual Question Is at
Stake?
The question of ‘implementing the antecedent’ is hugely important for policy
purposes. In the philosophy literature the topic is usually discussed under the
heading of ‘backtracking’. The dominant view is that counterfactuals have to be
non-backtracking. That is, for the evaluation of a counterfactual it should not
matter how the antecedent is brought about. However, in general the evaluation
of the kinds of genuine counterfactuals of direct use for policy will be extremely
sensitive to the methods of implementation. Consider a standard example from
philosophy. Jack and Jim had a quarrel yesterday and Jack is still furious. The
question is if had Jim asked Jack for a favour today, would Jack have obliged?
One plausible answer is ‘Yes’, since for Jim to ask Jack for a favour, there would
have had to have been no quarrel before.14
Implementation matters all the more for policy. Suppose the counterfactual
question of interest is ‘Had investment in schooling, I, been i (rather than i∗ < i,
the actual value), what would the income, Z, of the cohort have been?’ In the
real world, the additional money cannot be manna from heaven – it has to be
raised somewhere. And it might matter whether it would have been taken from
the defence budget or the social security budget. For in either case, it is very
likely that the cohort would have been influenced by the loss (e.g. because some
unemployed would have received less benefit or some recruits would not have
been hired) but in an asymmetric way (it is plausible to assume, for instance,
that the cohort would have been less influenced had the money come from the
defence budget).
So to assess the truth value of any particular counterfactual that we hope
to use in policy formation we will need to know what changes are supposed to
happen, where often the exact details matter. Sometimes when we consider a
policy we have a very definite idea in mind how it will be implemented. We shall
call the related counterfactuals, ‘implementation specific’. At the other end of
the scale, we might have no idea at all; the counterfactuals are ‘implementation
neutral’. When we evaluate counterfactuals, we had better be clear what exactly
we are presuming.
For counterfactuals that are totally implementation specific, we know exactly
what we are asking when we ask ‘What would happen if. . . ?’15 For others there
are a variety of different strategies we might adopt. For one, we can employ the
usual devices for dealing with epistemic uncertainty. We might, for instance,
assess the probabilities of the various possible methods of implementation and
weight the probability of the counterfactual consequent accordingly. In the
methodology of economics literature we find another alternative: Stephen LeRoy
and Daniel Hausman focus on counterfactuals that would be true regardless of
14See e.g. Lewis 1979.
15Or rather, we know this relative to the factors included in the causal model. Presumably
no causal model will be complete, so this remains as a source of ambiguity in our counterfactual
claims.
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how they are implemented. We begin with LeRoy.
LeRoy’s stated concern is with causal ordering among quantities, not with
counterfactuals. But, it seems, he equates ‘p causes q’ with ‘if p were to change,
q would change as well’ – so long as we give the ‘right’ reading to the counter-
factual. It is his proposed reading for the counterfactual that matters here. It
may help to present his brief discussion of a stock philosophical example before
looking to more economic cases – the case of birth control pills and thrombosis.
Birth control pills cause thrombosis; they also prevent pregnancy, which is
itself a cause of thrombosis. LeRoy assumes that whether a woman becomes
pregnant depends on both her sexual activity and whether she takes pills. Now
consider: ‘What would happen vis-a`-vis thrombosis were a particular woman
to become pregnant?’ That, LeRoy points out, is ambiguous – it depends on
whether the change in pregnancy comes about because of a change in pill-taking
or because of a change in sexual activity.
In his formal characterisation LeRoy treats systems of linear deterministic
‘reduced form equations’: ‘In current usage an economic model is a map from a
space of exogenous variables – agents’ characteristics and resource endowments,
for example – to a space of endogenous variables – prices and allocations.’16
LeRoy assumes that the equations are functionally correct and that variables
designated as ‘exogenous’ are not caused by any of the remaining (endogenous)
variables. Since they are functionally related to the endogenous variables, we
may assume that either they are causes of some of the endogenous variables
or are correlated with such causes. For LeRoy’s purposes it seems we must
suppose they are causes. He also supposes that the possible sources of imple-
mentation for a change in an endogenous variable are exactly the members of
the minimal set of exogenous variables that will fix the value of the endoge-
nous variable according to the economic model. Together these assumptions
constitute a characterization of the causal model that will be used to evaluate
counterfactuals.
For illustration of his semantics, LeRoy considers a familiar supply and de-
mand model:
qs = αs + αspp+ αsww
qd = αd + αdpp+ αdii
qs = qd = q. (1)
Here p is price; q, quantity; w, weather; i, income. LeRoy asks what the effect
of a change in price would be on the equilibrium quantity. By the conventions
just described, a change in price can come about through changes in weather,
income or both, and nothing else. But, LeRoy notes, “any of an infinite number
of pairs of shifts in the exogenous variables ‘weather’ and ‘income’ could have
caused the assumed changes in price, and these map onto different values of
16LeRoy 2003, p. 1
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q”.17 Thus the question has no definite answer – it all depends on how the
change in p is brought about.
LeRoy contrasts this model with a different one:
qs = αs + αsww + αsff
qd = αd + αdpp+ αdii
qs = qd = q, (2)
where f is fertilizer. Here fertilizer and weather can change the equilibrium
quantity, and no matter how they do so, the change in price will be the same.
In this case LeRoy is content that the counterfactual, “If q were to change
from taking the value Q to taking the value Q + ∆, p would change from P
= (Q – αd– αdiI)/αdp to P = (Q+ ∆ – αd– αdiI)/αdp” is unambiguous (and
true). The lesson he draws is the following (where we substitute counterfac-
tual language for his causal language): “[Counterfactual] statements involving
endogenous variables as [antecedents] are ambiguous except when all the inter-
ventions consistent with a given change in the [antecedent] map onto the same
change in the [consequent]”.18
The statement as it stands is too strong. Some counterfactuals are, after
all, either implicitly or explicitly implementation specific. In (1) we could ask,
for instance, what the value of q would have been had p = P been brought
about by i = I. What LeRoy offers instead is a semantics for counterfactuals
that are, either implicitly or explicitly, implementation neutral. In this case the
consequent should obtain no matter what possible change occurs to bring the
antecedent about.
Daniel Hausman seems to have distinguished between implementation-specific
and implementation-neutral counterfactuals, too, as we do here, though he does
not explicitly say so. He considers an example in which engineers designing
a nuclear power plant ask, “What would happen if the steam pipe were to
burst?”19 The answer, he argues, depends on how it will burst. “Responsible
engineers”, he argues, must look to the origins of the burst “when the conse-
quences of the pipe’s bursting depend on what caused it to burst.”20 That is,
in these situations responsible engineers will ask implementation-specific ‘What
if?’ questions.
On the other hand, when Hausman turns to providing some constraints that
a general semantics for counterfactuals must satisfy if we are to use counterfac-
tuals to establish causal order, he seems to be concerned with implementation-
neutral counterfactuals. It is not worth going into the details here; the results are
similar to LeRoy’s. Any semantics that satisfies Hausman’s constraints should
give the same result as LeRoy’s prescription when restricted to counterfactuals
evaluated via what LeRoy calls an ‘economic model’.
17ibid., p. 6
18ibid., p. 6
19Hausman 1998, p. 122
20ibid.
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So we may have counterfactuals that are implementation specific; we may
have ones that assume some one or another of a range of possible implemen-
tations; and we may have implementation-neutral ones where we wish to find
out what would happen no matter how the change in the antecedent is brought
about. For thinking about policy we had better know which kind of counterfac-
tual we are asserting and ensure that our semantics is appropriate to it.
4 How We Evaluate Counterfactuals: Pearl and
Why That’s Not Good Enough
We begin with Judea Pearl because his account is the most formal, the most
complete and the most powerful of any methods currently available, allowing
evaluations of complex counterfactuals and their probabilities. Pearl is famous
for his work on artificial intelligence, causal search algorithms and reasoning
under uncertainty. In his work on causality, he is an advocate of the so-called
Bayes’-nets methods. Although Bayes’ nets can be put to a large variety of uses,
one prominent application lies in causal inference. Here, they function as a tool
for learning causal relationships from conditional probabilities on the basis of
assumptions about the system considered.
As tools for causal inference, Bayes’ nets methods are part of what we have
called the ‘Hume programme’: the programme that aims at replacing ‘problem-
atic’ causal notions with ‘unproblematic’ ones. We must emphasise that Pearl
himself is not a strict Humean. He does not want to eliminate causal talk al-
together. But he too uses his system in order to explicate more problematic
causal notions, for example those relating to singular causation, in terms of less
problematic notions, for example that of a causal model. Pearl’s semantics for
counterfactuals plays a vital role in his explication of causal notions. Since one
might be tempted to think it doubles as a semantics for genuine ‘What if?’
questions, let us examine his account in more detail here.
Pearl envisages counterfactual statements of the form ‘The value that Y
would have obtained, had X been x’.21 According to him, counterfactual state-
ments are always evaluated within a causal model. A probabilistic causal model
is defined as a quadruple < U , V , F , P (u) >, where:
1. U is a set of variables that are determined by factors outside the model;
2. V is a set of variables that are determined by variables in the model;
3. F is a set of functions {f1, f2, . . . , fn} such that each fi is a mapping
from U
⋃
(V \Vi) to Vi and such that the entire set F forms a mapping
from U to V ;
4. P (u) is a probability function over the domain of U .22
21Pearl 2000, p. 204 (Def 7.1.5 ‘Counterfactual’)
22This is actually a merger of two of Pearl’s definitions. For the precise formulations, see
Pearl 2000, pp. 204f. (Definitions 7.1.1, ‘Causal Model’, and 7.1.6, ‘Probabilistic Causal
Model’).
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Condition (iii) says that each fi gives use the value of Vi given the values of
all other variables in U
⋃
V , which is unique in case the system is recursive or
‘acyclic’.23 Each fi is supposed to be functionally correct in the situation mod-
elled and the quantities on the right-hand-side are supposed to be a complete
set of ‘direct causes’ of the quantity on the left.24
An important notion in Pearl’s system is that of a submodel. A submodelMx
of a model M is relative to realisations x of a set of variables X. It is formed by
deleting all functions in M that have members of X as an effect and replacing
it with the constant function X = x. The effect of action ‘set X to x’, in short
do(X = x), on M is given by the submodel Mx. Finally, a counterfactual of the
form ‘The value Y that would have obtained, had X been x’ on M is defined
as the solution of M for Y under the action do(X = x), that is, of Mx. The
counterfactual value Pearl also calls ‘potential response’ and abbreviates it with
Yx(u).
Pearl introduces a theorem according to which a counterfactual can be eval-
uated using three steps.25 The theorem shows how to assess the conditional
probability P (BA|e) of a counterfactual statement of the form ‘If it were A then
B’, given evidence e:
1. Abduction – Update P (u) by the evidence e to obtain P (u | e).
2. Action – Modify M by the action do(A), where A is the antecedent of
the counterfactual to obtain the submodel MA.
3. Prediction – Use the modified model. . . to compute the probability of
B, the consequence of the counterfactual.
Let us then examine one of Pearl’s policy analysis examples that we can
understand the definitions. The example consists of two equations:26
q c= b1p+ d1i+ u1, (3)
p c= b2q + d2w + u2, (4)
where q is the quantity demanded for some good, p is its price, i is income, w
is the wage rate and u1 and u2 are error terms. Given the modularity assumption
– each equation represents an autonomous mechanism – (3) and (4) constitute
a causal model with Q and P as endogenous and U1, U2, I and W as the
exogenous variables (M =<{U1, U2, I, W}, {Q, P}, {(3), (4)}, P (u) >).
Pearl considers the policy question, ‘Given that the observed price is P = p0,
what would be the expected value of the demand Q had we controlled the price
23‘Acyclic’ is a term from graph theory which basically means that there are no loops in
the system.
24A direct cause is a cause that makes a contribution to the effect that is not mediated via
other variables represented in the model.
25Theorem 7.1.7, p. 206
26pp. 215ff. The symbol ‘c=’ replaces Pearl’s ‘=’ and reads ‘functionally equivalent and
the variables on the right hand side cause the variables on the left hand side’.
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to be P = p1?’. The required probability, P (QP=p1| P = p0), can be evaluated
as follows, using the three steps.
1. Abduction – Update P (u1) by the evidence P = p0 as well as I = i,
W = w to obtain P (u1|P = p0, I = i, W = w).
2. Action – Modify M by the action do(P = p1). That is, formulate the
submodel MP =p1:
q c= b1p+ d1i+ u1,
p = p1.
3. Prediction – Use the modified model to compute the probability of Q.
This yields for the expected value of Q:
E(QP=p1|p0, i, w) = b1 + p1 + d1i+ E(U1|p0, i, w).
One of the advantages of Pearl’s semantics is that it ties in very nicely with
purely philosophical accounts. In particular, it can be shown that under certain
conditions Pearl’s and Lewis’s semantics yield the same results (for recursive
systems).27 In order to achieve this equivalence, the counterfactual Yx(u) = y
Pearl’s notation is equated with Lewis’s A 2→ B (and A with the proposition
that X = x holds and B with the proposition that Y = y holds).
In Lewis’s account, the counterfactual antecedent is brought about ‘by mir-
acle’. That is, the laws that are responsible for A to obtain are broken and A
is brought about ex nihilo. Equivalently, Pearl explicitly breaks all causal laws
that have X as an effect and replaces these laws with the constant X = x.
What seems to be an advantage from a philosophical point of view is detri-
mental from the point of view of the policy maker. For Pearl’s semantics to
work, it is required that the law for each variable in the system (P and Q in
the example) be separately manipulable, and he reads the counterfactuals as
supposing that the implementations can be represented by changes in exactly
the laws governing the antecedent and no others. To evaluate a counterfactual,
we model the implementation in one special way: by destroying one set of causal
laws, replacing it with another set and leaving the rest of the system intact.28
Do all socio-economic systems of interest for policy making behave like this?
We believe not. We shall illustrate that by pointing to one large class of systems
27Pearl 2000, pp. 238ff.
28It is of course always possible to evaluate a counterfactual according to Pearl’s method
assuming the truth of a model with the right properties (as we have done in the example).
Thus, whether or not real socio-economic systems have these properties does not matter.
Pearl is explicit, however, that he understands causality and related notions to append to the
world, rather than a model (or our language, say). Models represent real features of the world.
For policy considerations, then, we want the model to be true of the world and therefore the
system in the world, not just the model, must have the right properties.
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relevant for policy making familiar in economics. These are systems where
agents’ expectations play a role in determining the relations between the control
variable and the target variable (the well-known ‘rational expectations’ models
represent a special case of these). Consider a simple model of the money market:
money demand :
mt = pt + yt − λit (5)
money supply :
mt = m∗ + γ(y∗ − yt−1) + υt, (6)
where m = money, p = price level, y = real output, i = nominal interest rate,
m∗ = exogenous money supply, y∗ = potential output and υ = white noise.
This we present this model for expositional purposes only, we omit the goods
side of the economy, which contains the expectations parameters.
Let us consider the counterfactual question ‘What would the value of the
price level p have been, had the money supply been mc?’ How would we model
that counterfactual a` la Pearl? He asks us first to replace the feedback mecha-
nism (6) with a constant law:
mt = mc, (7)
where the mc defines some constant value of m. What would the agents in the
economy make out of it? As far as we know, there is no uniform answer in the
literature but here are a number of possible replies.
First and foremost, the reply will depend on what the agents know. It seems
that the most natural reply to Pearl’s question would be that despite the central
bank’s regime change, the agents would believe that (6) is still intact. Since mc
is a possible realisation of (6), viz. in case
υt = mc – m∗ – γ(y∗ – yt−1),
the agents might still use (5)-(6) in their decision making. The point is that
Pearl wants us to model the shift from the actual to the counterfactual situation
minimally. Thus he replaces one law in the system with another one. If that
means that the agents’ expectations remain the same the central bank can
change as much as it wants, agents’ expectations would be formulated on the
basis of (5)-(6) rather than (7). In this case, we would have to formulate Pearl’s
question more precisely as ‘What would the value of the price level p have been,
had money supply beenmc due to a realisation of the error term of υt = mc –m∗
– γ(y∗− yt−1)?’. In order to evaluate this counterfactual, we would just update
the agent’s beliefs using (5)-(6) and the realisation of υt. Pearl’s semantics
would not apply.
Alternatively, we could mean the counterfactual to say that central bank
policy has now changed (temporarily? permanently?) to a fixed policy regime.
Fixed-policy regimes, however, are usually not modelled as (7) but as a mix of a
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deterministic term plus a random component. Economic agents are usually not
held to believe that the central bank can perfectly control the money supply.
Thus we have, e.g.,
mt = mc + εt. (8)
This comes closest to Pearl’s suggestion. It would answer the question “What
would the value of the price level p have been, had money supply beenmc due to
(a) a credible switch of monetary policy to a fixed regime and (b) the realisation
of εt = 0?”
Another alternative is to have the agents believe that the central bank has
changed its policy to a so-called regime-switching system. This could be repre-
sented by
m∗ + γ(y∗ − yt−1) + υt with probability q
mt = (9)
mc + εt with probability (1− q).
The counterfactual question we answer with this model would be very similar
to the preceding one but we would have ‘regime switching system’ instead of
‘fixed policy regime’. None of the preceding models models the expectations
formation process of the agents very deeply. In particular, one can assume that
the agents realise that the central bank’s decision to set the value for the money
supply is itself an outcome of a rational procedure. For example, they might
believe that the central bank aims at minimising the following loss function:
L = Et−1(pt − zt−1)2, (10)
where z is an exogenous target value. The central bank would then set the
money supply mc such that Et−1(pt) = zt−1. A change in mc, then, would
imply that the target variable z has changed.
The moral of this story is that if expectations matter, Pearl’s semantics
might not be applicable. Pearl assumes that we can change each law on its own.
However, if some laws in a system contain expectations, the actual changes may
be of little relevance. What matters more is what agents can be made to believe.
And in order to make them believe the right thing, many more things might
have to change than the one law Pearl envisages.
This is not, however, a problem confined to cases of rational expectations
but a general one for Pearl’s account. Pearl evaluates one particular kind of
implementation-specific counterfactual, where the counterfactual antecedent is
brought about by a precise incision that changes exactly the laws governing the
counterfactual antecedent and nothing else at all (except what follows causally
from just that difference). When we consider implementing a policy, we want
to know what would happen were the policy really set in place – and this may
well involve a variety of changes beyond those Pearl admits.
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The problem is not with implementations that involve complex changes each
of which can be represented in the overall scheme as a change in the value of
one of the variables. Although we have not described it here, Pearl offers a
detailed account of how to deal both with cases where our actions are complex
– they involve changes in a number of different variables at once, and also
where our complex actions may be conditional in specified ways on the values
that other variables take. The problem is rather with implementations that
result in changes in some of the causal laws that describe the system.
We might most easily locate this problem in Pearl’s characterisation of a
causal model. Recall, a causal model for Pearl contains a set of equations, one
for each effect. The effect is to be written on the left-hand side; on the right
is a full set of direct causes of that effect, where the values of these causal
variables fix the value of the effect. Note first that this means that Pearl’s
scheme cannot be used to evaluate counterfactuals in systems where causes may
act purely probabilistically. Nor can it deal with systems where the causal laws
themselves may be affected by our policies, for instance, where the causal laws
are tied together so that if one changes, so too will others, or so too probably
will others.
This is a familiar phenomenon and we are not always out of our depths
in dealing with it. Occasionally we understand what will happen to the laws
of the system as we implement different kinds of change and can provide a
scientific account of it. This is one of the central aims of rational expectations
theory, which is why we have used a rational expectations case as an example.
Rational expectations methods cannot be encompassed by Pearl’s scheme. But
this is only an example. The general problem with Pearl’s scheme is that it
provides no place to encode information that we might well have about how the
changes we envisage will affect the causal laws by which the system operates.
His characterisation of what constitutes a causal model is too narrow.
We should note that there is one quick solution to this problem that will
not do: simply add more causal laws to express the information needed. In
its first preliminary form the answer will not do because we need information
about how changes in causal laws are correlated with each other and it does not
make sense to write down causal laws that take causal laws themselves as both
antecedents and consequents.
A different version of the answer supposes that where these problems arise it
must always be because we are focusing on the wrong set of causal laws, a set of
causal laws at the ‘wrong level’. This view takes as a paradigm the situation in
which there is some set of fundamental laws that have no connections with each
other: each can change separately. From these, given certain specified boundary
conditions, some further less fundamental laws can be derived. Under this pic-
ture, if there is a change in some targeted derivative law (keeping the boundary
conditions fixed), there must necessarily be a change in the fundamental laws;
this in turn might well lead to changes in other derivative laws beyond the one
targeted. In this kind of situation, so the answer goes, counterfactuals should
be evaluated relative to a causal model that describes the fundamental laws,
not one that employs the derivative.
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There are a number of problems with this way of defending the universal
applicability of Pearl’s scheme. The first concerns what the character of eco-
nomic laws really is. We agree that the story of two tiers of causal laws, one
more fundamental than the other, does show how correlations among laws can
come about. But we have no reason to think that it is the only way. Moreover,
whether there is one tier or many, it does not seem likely– no matter how far
‘down’ we go – that the principles for economic systems need ever have the kind
of independence from each other that Pearl’s scheme demands29.
The second set of problems concern the more realistic issues of how best
to deploy what we know. Even if the two-tier story is the right account for
why changes in certain economic principles occur in tandem, it is very often
much harder to learn about the ‘more fundamental’ tier given even our best
methods for empirical inference in economics. Nor do we need to know the
principles at this level to evaluate our counterfactuals. What we need to know
and to encode in our causal models is how the principles we propose using
to make counterfactual judgements are likely to change given our envisaged
implementations, and that is something we often come to learn, or to have good
bets about, without having to calculate it from a ‘more fundamental’ theory.
Last, we should notice that rational expectations theory itself does not fit
Pearl’s scheme. Notoriously the theory does offer a two-tier account of why
certain ‘observational’ regularities may well not be stable as we try to use them
to implement policy. The observational regularities are supposed to be a con-
sequence of the behaviour of rational agents and those agents will – because
they are rational – change their mode of behaviour if they foresee that a new
policy will be implemented. Thus the observational regularities that arise under
the older modes of behaviour may well no longer obtain were the policy to be
implemented (or were agents to expect it to be implemented).
Nevertheless the methods suggested by rational expectations theory for cal-
culating what would happen were a new policy undertaken are more complex
than those proposed by Pearl. We do not just replace the law for the policy vari-
able with a new one setting the value at the proposed level, then deduce from
the ‘fundamental’ laws in their original unchanged form with parameters fixed
what the values of the target variables will be. For there is an interaction en-
visaged between the two tiers – a ‘self-consistency’ requirement is invoked. The
variables that appear in the ‘fundamental’ laws include expectations (in the
sense of beliefs and predictions) that the agents have about macro variables;
the values of these are supposed to match the expectations (in the statistical
average sense) of those macro variables in the less fundamental laws. This pro-
vides a method – albeit not formalised – for calculating simple (non-complex,
non-conditional) counterfactuals. But so far as we can see, it cannot be fitted
into Pearl’s scheme.
Why does Pearl focus on this one kind of implementation, where variables
change as the counterfactual antecedent is implemented, but no laws, excepting
those governing the counterfactual antecedent? One reason is to resolve the
29See e.g. Estrella and Fuhrer 1999.
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problems of ambiguity. As we discussed in Section 3 ordinary language counter-
factuals are open. They have different truth values depending on how they are
supposed to be implemented. We have advocated disambiguating the counter-
factual before trying to evaluate it; so too does Pearl. His detailed work on how
to assess counterfactuals with complex and conditional antecedents is testimony
to that.
Pearl is also worried about the problems of ambiguity that arise if laws can
change. His solution here is to treat all counterfactuals the same. He insists
that the laws of a causal model can be changed one at a time and that the right
reading of the counterfactual is the one that supposes that that is just what
happens: the laws governing the antecedent change and only those laws. This
will work sometimes, but, as we have argued, it does not allow us to answer
all the ‘What if?’ questions we want to ask. On the other hand, Pearl’s is
the most complete and well developed formal apparatus available for assessing
counterfactuals in science. This is why we are keen to bring this issue to the
fore.
One of the tasks that Pearl’s particular semantics undertakes is that rec-
ommended by the Hume programme, that is, the elimination of ‘problematic’
causal notions in favour of non-causal ones. For example, Pearl defines the
causal effect of one variable on another in terms of counterfactuals and then
shows how to calculate the causal effect from the probabilities of propositions
that employ neither causal nor counterfactual notions. As we noted, this is just
the kind of programme that philosophers have been heavily engaged in; in par-
ticular Pearl’s account is very similar to that of David Lewis30. Pearl’s account
like Lewis’s is skewed towards the job of evaluating counterfactuals that can
deliver the right verdicts on the targeted causal concepts. Correlatively it fails
to provide the right answers to large numbers of genuine ‘What if?’ questions
we want to ask.
What then of our claim above that Pearl provides a proof that his semantics
is indeed a semantics for counterfactuals? The proof is in the form of a rep-
resentation theorem. He first provides some independent characteristics that
counterfactuals are supposed to satisfy, then shows that these characteristics
hold of the propositions his semantics evaluates and, conversely, that for any
set of propositions for which these characteristics hold, there is a causal model
renders them true under his semantics.
The trouble is with Pearl’s characteristics for counterfactuals. One is called
composition. Pearl describes it this way: ‘Composition states that, if we force
a variable (W ) to a value w that it would have had without our intervention,
then the intervention will have no effect on other variables in the system.’31
Composition is fine when antecedents are implemented by miracles of the kind
employed by Pearl and Lewis. But it is not a characteristic of counterfactuals in
general. Most ways of implementing a counterfactual antecedent will produce
knock-on effects different from what would have obtained had the antecedent
30See Lewis 1973, 1979 and 1986.
31Pearl 2000, p. 229
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occurred without the implementation. That is particularly true of the kinds of
real life implementations available to us in complex policy situations.
Pearl’s scheme can serve as a model for what is needed. It has the three
requisite ingredients for a semantics for counterfactuals and it is both rich in
detail and formally set-up to allow for the proof of a variety of important and
interesting results. But it itself does not do the job of providing a semantics for
genuine ‘What if?’ counterfactuals.
5 Input Counterfactuals and Output Counter-
factuals: James Heckman
Counterfactuals are an important topic in economic methodology today, espe-
cially since they have been championed by Nobel prize winner James Heckman32.
Superficially the way the counterfactuals are pictured to work by Heckman is
much as we have urged. A causal model is postulated and rules are supplied for
how to calculate answers to specific ‘What if?’ questions from the model. But
when it comes to setting counterfactuals to use there is a big difference. For the
counterfactual analysis provided by Heckman cannot in general answer ‘What
if?’ questions of the kind we pose in planning, policy and evaluation. Nor does
Heckman claim that it can. The analysis is offered, rather, as in the philosophy
literature, as a causal surrogate. We wish to underline the fact that the two
jobs are different. We cannot assume that what serves for the one job will serve
for the other.
This does not mean, however, that the causal-surrogate counterfactuals are
irrelevant for policy and planning. We shall point out that they can serve as in-
puts for constructing the causal models employed in generating the genuine pol-
icy counterfactuals needed for planning as outputs. This will require, however,
a weaker interpretation than that put on the causal-surrogate counterfactuals.
As in the philosophy literature, Heckman’s counterfactuals are offered as a
way of defining causal concepts in terms of presumably less problematic non-
causal concepts. We propose to view them instead as a way for finding out
about independently understood causal relations in special situations. Entirely
separate sets of considerations may then tell us whether we can export knowledge
about these causal relations to new situations, for which we need to construct
causal models and generate counterfactual outputs.
What kinds of considerations are required? The distinction between in-
ternal and external validity is of use here. A causal claim is internally valid
if it is correct for the experimental system in which it was established. By
contrast, the claim is externally valid if in addition it is correct for (possibly
non-experimental) situations outside the original system. There is no system-
atic answer available to the question of how to establish external validity. We
make only one small contribution here. The counterfactuals that are on offer as
causal surrogates have little external validity when they are conceived as coun-
32Heckman 2000 and 2001
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terfactuals. Indeed they very often do not even make sense in the new situation.
They only become relevant if they can be taken as measures of causal relations
that hold in the situations in which the causal-surrogate counterfactuals are
evaluated and that might (or might not) hold in the target situation.
We have talked about the importance of counterfactuals to questions of
policy. Similarly when we want evaluate the effectiveness of a trial programme
we need answers to counterfactual questions: What if the programme had not
existed? Or had existed in some other form? Or were set up more widely without
the trial controls? These are just the kinds of questions Heckman considers in
his applied work on the evaluation of labour market programmes, where he is
at pains to point out that the question itself must be carefully formulated.
We have stressed the ambiguity in ordinary counterfactuals about how the
antecedent will be implemented. Heckman points out other sources of ambiguity.
We may for instance want to know what the wages of workers in the population
at large would have been had the programme not existed; more commonly we
end up asking what the wages of workers in the programme would have been. Or
we may want to know what the GDP would have been without the programme.
We also need to take care about the contrast class: do we want to know the
difference between the results of the programme and those that would have
occurred had no alternatives been present or the difference compared to other
programmes, real or envisaged?
Heckman begins his treatment with causal functions. As with LeRoy’s start-
ing point, causal functions are a special kind of sparse causal model. The mod-
els describe special kinds of systems, systems that mimic experiments: ‘Causal
functions are . . . derived from conceptual experiments where exogenously spec-
ified generating variables are varied. . . The specification of these hypothetical
variations is a crucial part of model specification and lies at the heart of any
rigorous definition of causality’.33
Heckman tells us three things about causal functions: i) They ‘describe how
each possible vector of generating variables is mapped into a resulting outcome’,
where the generating variables ‘completely determine’ the outcome.34 ii) They
‘derive from’ – or better, we think, ‘describe’ – conceptual experiments. iii)
Touching on questions of realism and of model choice, models involving causal
functions are always underdetermined by evidence; hence, as Heckman sees it,
causality is just ‘in the head’ since the models relative to which it is defined are
just in the head. From this we take it that causal functions represent (a probably
proper subset of) the causal principles under which these special experiment-like
systems operate, where the right-hand-side variables – the ones Heckman calls
the ‘generating variables’ – form a minimal complete set of causes of the quantity
represented on the left35 and where each cause can each vary independently of
the others; i.e. they are variation-free.36 This is why we say that Heckman’s
33Heckman 2001, p. 14
34ibid., p. 12
35Or, keeping in mind Heckman’s view that causality is only relative to a model, the right-
hand-side variables record what the model designates as causes.
36Formally, a set of variables (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is variation-free iff (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ X1×X2
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starting point is a causal model.
Imagine that the causal function for an outcome y is given by
y c= g(x1, . . ., xn). (11)
The causal or counterfactual effect (Heckman seems to use the terms ‘causal
effect’ and ‘counterfactual effect’ interchangeably) of xj on y fixing the remaining
factors in the causal function is defined thus:
Causal effect of x j on y :
[∆y/∆xj = x′j − x′′j ] =df g(x1, . . ., x′j , . . .xn)− g(x1, . . ., x′′j , . . .xn). (12)
Read in terms of counterfactuals we have here the evaluation, relative to a
specific assignment of values to all xj , j 6= i, of the difference between the value
y would have were xi = x′i and the value y would have were xi = x
′′
i .
As Heckman insists, in order for this definition ‘to be meaningful requires
that the xj can be independently varied when the other variables are fixed so
that there are no functional restrictions connecting the arguments. . . it is thus
required that these variables be variation-free’.37 We shall call the counterfac-
tual effect as thus defined a Galilean effect since it is just the kind effect we look
for in a Galilean experiment, where a single cause is varied controlling for all
other relevant features in order to observe the effect of that cause ‘acting alone’.
Heckman considers simultaneous supply and demand equations as an exam-
ple. For simplicity we can look at the specific equations that we have already
considered in discussing LeRoy, where we have added the additional equilibrium
constraint on price:
qs = αs + αspps + αsww (13)
qd = αd + αdppd + αdii
qs = qd = q
ps = pd = p.
Heckman points out that these equations do not fit Pearl’s scheme since they
are not recursive and hence Pearl’s method for assessing counterfactuals will not
apply. This fits with familiar remarks about these kinds of systems: p and q are
determined jointly by exogenous factors. It seems then that it makes no sense
to ask about how much a change in pwill affect a change in q. To the contrary,
Heckman points out. We can still assess causal efficacy using his definition – so
long as certain ‘exclusion’ conditions are met.
Say we want to assess the causal/counterfactual effect of demand price on
quantity demanded. We first look to the reduced form equations:
. . . ×Xn.
37Heckman 2001, p. 18
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q = (zd, zs) (14)
p = (zd, zs),
where zd is the vector of exogenous variables in the demand equations and zs,
those in the supply equations. In LeRoy’s equations (13), zd = i and zs = w.
Heckman takes these to be causal functions, otherwise the causal model has not
properly specified the ‘exogenous’ variables. That means that the exogenous
variables are ‘generating variables’ for p and q and that they are variation free.
Now the task is easy: “Assuming that some components of [zd] do not appear
in [zs], that some components of [zs] do not appear in [zd], and that those
components have a non-zero impact on price, one can use the variation in the
excluded variables to vary [pd or ps in the reduced form equations] while holding
the other arguments of those equations fixed”.38 The result (using the equality
of pd and ps and of qd and qs) is
∂qd/∂pd − (∂q/∂zs(e))/(∂p/∂zs(e)), (15)
where zs(e) is a variable in zs that is excluded from zd and that, as he puts it,
‘has an impact on’ pd. In (13) this job can be done by w; the causal effect thus
calculated of pd on qd is αdp.
Notice how much causality is involved here. By definition we are supposed to
be evaluating the change in qd holding fixed all the factors in a causal function for
qd except pd. What we actually do is hold fixed zd while zs varies. Presumably
this is okay because zs is a cause of pd that can produce variations in pd while
zdis fixed; and zd being fixed matters because zd constitutes, along with pd, a
minimal full set of causes of qd. So when the exclusion condition is satisfied,
the demand equation is a causal function and the counterfactual definition of
causal effect is meaningful.
Now consider a slightly altered set of equations:
qs = αs + αspps + αsww + αsii (16)
qd = αd + αdppd + αdii+ αdww
qs = qd = q
ps = pd = p.
In this model the demand equation cannot be treated as a causal function and
the question of the causal effect of demand price on quantity demanded is mean-
ingless. This is true despite the fact that αdp still appears in the equation and
it still represents something – something much the same one would suppose
– about the bearing of pd on qd. The intermediate case seems even stranger.
Imagine that αsw = 0. Now αsp measures a Galilean effect but αdp does not.
38Heckman 2001, p. 36
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We propose an alternative interpretation of what is going on. We begin with
causal principles. One can be a realist about the principles of a causal model.
They are correct if and only if they approximate well enough to the causal laws
that govern the operation of the system in question. Heckman, it seems, is not
a realist. But that does not matter here since he himself has introduced the
notion of a causal function. A causal principle is just like a causal function but
without the restriction that the causes (or ‘generating variables’) are variation
free. We shall continue to restrict attention to linear causal models of the kind
both LeRoy and Heckman use for illustration. Then define for any linear causal
model, the contribution a cause x c makes to an effect x e =df the coefficient of xc
in any causal principle for xe in the model.39 It is trivial to show for any linear
causal model that where Heckman’s measure for the causal/counterfactual effect
of xc on xe applies, it has the same value as the contribution xc makes to xe.
Given this characterisation the contribution of pd to qd is the same in (13)
and (16). What is different is that in (13) we have a particular way to find
out about it that is not available in (16). (13) is what we call an epistemically
convenient system40: having an epistemically convenient system implies among
other things that it is possible to find out what a cause, xc, contributes to an
effect, xe, in one particular simple way – hold fixed all the other contributions
that add up to make the effect the size it is; then vary the cause and see how
much xe varies. Any difference has to be exactly the contribution that xc adds.
This does not mean, however, that for systems where this independent variation
is not possible, all is lost. There are hosts of other legitimate ways of defending
claims about the size of causal contributions that apply both in systems with
independent variation and in ones without.
There are two advantages to the account that takes Heckman’s causal sur-
rogate counterfactuals as measures of causal contributions rather than as mere
counterfactuals.
First, few systems we confront are governed by principles in which the causes
are variation free. The vast majority are not. In these systems Heckman’s
counterfactuals are irrelevant.
Second, even if we are studying a system where the causes are variation free,
there is a puzzle about why we should wish to ask just these implementation-
specific questions. If we are thinking of setting policy or evaluating the success
of some programme in the system, then these, with their special method of
implementation, might be relevant sometimes. But there is no necessity to
implement policies in the single way highlighted by Heckman; generally we would
want to consider a variety of different methods of implementation and frequently
to assess implementation-neutral counterfactuals as well. Even where causes are
variation free, the counterfactual changes that Heckman studies generally have
no privileged role.
39This supposes that all principles in the model with xc on the right-hand-side and xe
on the left will have the same coefficient. This will be the case given a proper statement
of ‘transitivity’ and the definitions for the form of causal principles sketched in Cartwright
forthcoming.
40For a definition see Cartwright forthcoming.
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There are two familiar enterprises where they do have a special role. The
first is in trying to determine if, and to what degree, one factor contributes
causally to another. In an epistemically convenient system we can ask Galilean-
type counterfactual questions; and the answers we obtain will double as answers
to our causal questions. They are a tool for finding out answers to our causal
questions. But note that they are only a tool for finding out about causes in
special epistemically convenient systems. For other systems we cannot even ask
these counterfactual questions, let alone let the answers to them supply our
causal answers as well.
The other is in Heckman’s own field, evaluation. In setting up new pro-
grammes, we might try to set them up in such a way that the causal contribu-
tion they make to the result can be readily disentangled from the contribution
of other factors. Of particular concern are other factors that might both con-
tribute to the effect independently of the programme and also make it more
likely that an individual entered (or failed to enter) the programme. If we can
arrange the setup of our programme so that it is epistemically convenient, then
again we can ask Galilean counterfactual questions – ‘What difference would
there be in outcome with the programme present versus the programme absent,
holding fixed all other contributions to the outcome?’ And again these coun-
terfactual questions will tell us the contribution the programme makes, since in
these circumstances the difference in outcome between when the programme is
present and when it is absent must be exactly the contribution the programme
makes. So we can use information about Galilean effects to learn about the
causal contributions of the programme we set up. Still, all we learn is about
that programme in those special epistemically convenient circumstances.
In either case, whether it be experimental systems or programme set-ups that
we engineer to make the measurement of causal contributions easy, we need to
ask, why should we be interested in causal contributions in these special – and
rare – kinds of systems? The answer is clear. Generally we want this information
because we hope it will tell us something about causal contributions in other
systems. But we confront here the familiar problem of internal and external
validity. In an epistemically convenient (linear) system, using counterfactual
differences as a measure of causal contributions is provably valid: internal to
the situation this method is bound to give us correct results about the question
of interest. But nothing said in this discussion bears on external validity: when
will the results that we can be sure are correct in an epistemically convenient
system hold elsewhere?
So how do these odd Galilean counterfactuals bear on more useful ‘What
if?’ counterfactuals? In a very indirect way, it seems. We can use Galilean
counterfactuals to tell us about causal contributions in Galilean experiments.
Then, to the extent that we can expect the facts about causal contributions to
remain stable across situations of interest, we can use the information about
causal contributions in Galilean experiments to help build causal models for
new non-Galilean situations. And we can use the causal models so constructed
for these new situations to answer real ‘What if?’ questions that we want to ask
about these new situations. Galilean counterfactuals are one of many inputs in
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a multi step process that yields as outputs counterfactuals of immediate use in
policy and planning.
It is important to stress, however, that assumptions about when information
about causal contributions learned in one setting will obtain in others are not
justified by anything we have discussed so far, and in particular not by any
information about counterfactuals of the kinds we have explored. Showing that
results on causal contributions have external validity – and how far and of
what kind – requires a different methodology altogether. This is one of the
reason we have been at pains to distinguish input counterfactuals from output
counterfactuals.
Recent work in economics like that of LeRoy and Heckman provides some
clear formal characterisations of how to evaluate special counterfactuals with
very particular assumptions about their methods of implementation. But they
leave us a long way from any characterisation of counterfactuals whose imple-
mentations are the ones we are generally interested in. For we have no good
rules for how to judge external validity; that is, for when we can export what we
learn from a Galilean effect to build a causal model for a non-Galilean situation.
And then, as we saw in discussing Pearl, we have only a thin start on how to
use a causal model to answer the ‘What if?’ questions we ask for planning and
policy.
6 Conclusion: Disambiguate Before You Evalu-
ate
The lesson we want to draw from the preceding discussion can be captured by
the slogan ‘Disambiguate before you evaluate’. All three accounts we have been
looking at provide unambiguous semantics for counterfactuals. But they do
so at the cost of seriously constraining the range of admissible counterfactual
questions. More importantly, they often provide semantics for counterfactuals
that have no relevance for policy analysis whatsoever. What we urge instead is
to disambiguate the question first and subsequently use semantics that are tied
closely to precisely that kind of question.
First and foremost, we will need to know whether the counterfactual at
stake is Heckman-style Galilean counterfactual of the kind we have discussed
in Section 5 or a genuine policy counterfactual as discussed in Sections 2-4. A
Galilean counterfactual helps us to evaluate the contribution of a causal factor
to a quantity of interest in very specific – that is, epistemically convenient –
systems. Without further tests, the results of this evaluation tell us nothing
beyond the experimental system at hand. But we may be lucky and find that
test results are exportable or ‘externally valid’. In this case, we can use the
knowledge gained in one particular system as a building block for the evaluation
of a genuine policy counterfactual.
Let us assume that we have knowledge of all causal laws governing a partic-
ular socio-economic system. If we now want to evaluate a genuine policy coun-
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terfactual, we have to decide whether it is meant in an implementation-specific
or neutral sense. Implementation-neutral counterfactuals are true no matter
how the antecedent is brought about. These come in particularly handy in case
we don’t know how to implement the antecedent. But this kind of epistemic
uncertainty is neither necessary nor sufficient for evaluating counterfactuals in
an implementation-neutral way. On the one hand, we might just want to know
what the answer to our counterfactual question was in case it didn’t matter how
we implemented the antecedent. On the other hand, there are other strategies
available for situations of epistemic uncertainty. And these are important if the
causal structure of the socio-economic system that we contemplate does not lend
itself to implementation-neutral evaluation (Recall for instance that there was
no answer to LeRoy’s question for system (1), where the price variable appeared
in both equations).
Turning to implementation-specific counterfactuals, finally, once more both
metaphysics and epistemology matter. For systems which are characterised by
the axioms of Pearl’s formalism, we can use his semantics and implement the
antecedent without disturbing any other relationship in the system. But for
many socio-economic systems that will not do, so we may have to use the more
involved (and less formal) modelling strategies of, say, rational expectations
economics. In both cases we assume that we have a clear idea of how the
antecedent is to be brought about.
If not, we must fall back on alternative strategies to deal with epistemic
uncertainty. Though we may not know for sure where the money for the new
schooling programme comes from, we may know that it is far more likely to
be raised by a tax increase than by cutting defence. Thus we can use our best
guess as to the probability of each possible implementation and weigh the results
accordingly.
The main message of our musings about the use counterfactuals in policy
advice is, then, to make the underlying assumptions as transparent as possible.
Answering a counterfactual question can amount to a myriad of things. We
believe we had better be clear about precisely what issues are involved and give
answers that are tailored to the specific case at hand, rather than provide a
semantics that yields results across the board but in so doing fails to resolve the
question we are in fact interested in.
27
References
Cartwright, Nancy (1983), How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: OUP.
Cartwright, Nancy (1989), Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement, Ox-
ford: OUP.
Cartwright, Nancy (forthcoming), “Two Theorems on Invariance and Interven-
tion”, Philosophy of Science.
Edgington, Dorothy (1995), “On Conditionals”, Mind 104, 235-329.
Estrella, Arturo and Jeffrey Fuhrer (1999), “Are ‘Deep’ Parameters Stable? The
Lucas Critique as an Empirical Hypothesis”, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Working Paper 99-4.
Hamilton, James (1994), “Measuring the Liquidity Effect”, American Economic
Review 87:1, 80-97.
Hausman, Daniel (1998), Causal Asymmetries, Cambridge: CUP.
Heckman, James (2000), “Causal Parameters and Policy Analysis in Economics:
A Twentieth Century Retrospective”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115:1,
45-97.
Heckman, James (2001), “Econometrics Counterfactuals and Causal Models”,
Keynote Address International Statistical Institute, Seoul, South Korea.
Holland, Paul (1988), “Statistics and Causal Inference”, Journal of the Ameri-
can Statistical Association 81:396, 945-960.
Kyburg, Henry and Mariam Thalos (2003), Probability Is the Very Guide of
Life, Chicago and La Salle (Ill.): Open Court.
LeRoy, Stephen (2003), “Causality in Economics”, MS, University of California,
Santa Barbara.
Lewis, David (1973), “Causation”, Journal of Philosophy 70, 223-67. Reprinted
in Sosa, Ernest and Michael Tooley, Causation, Oxford: OUP (1993), 193-204.
Lewis, David (1979), “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow”, Nouˆs
13:4, 455-76.
Lewis, David (1986), “Postscripts to ‘Causation”’, Philosophical Papers Vol. 2,
Oxford: OUP, 172-213.
28
Lewis, David (2000), “Causation as Influence”, Journal of Philosophy 97, 182-
197.
Pearl, Judea (2000), Causation: Models, Reasoning and Inference, Cambridge:
CUP.
Reiss, Julian (forthcoming), “Review of Kevin Hoover’s Causality in Macroeco-
nomics”, Forum for Social Economics.
Rubin, Donald (1974), “Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized
and Nonrandomized Studies”, Journal of Educational Psychology 66, 688-701.
Simon, Herbert (1953), Causal ordering and identifiability. In Hood and Koop-
mans (eds), Studies in Econometric Method. Cowles Foundation monograph
No. 14.
Simon, Herbert (1954), “Spurious Correlation: A Causal Interpretation”, Jour-
nal of the American Statistical Association 49, 469-492.
Spirtes, Peter, Clark Glymour and Richard Scheines (2001), Causation, Predic-
tion and Search, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.
Stalnaker, Robert (1968), “A Theory of Conditionals”, in Studies in Logical The-
ory, American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series, 2, Oxford: Blackwell,
98-112.
29
